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A REPLY TO MESSRS. BERGER AND KANNER
Lois J. Schiffer*
Upon review of a draft of the response by Messrs. Berger
and Kanner' to my essay, Taking Stock of the Takings De-
bate,2 I have concluded that any reply should appear in the
same issue as the response. Often the best antidote for error
is immediate correction. In order to ensure publication in the
same issue as the response, a rapid reply was required.
Thus, I am limited to preliminary reactions based on a first
reading of a draft. Fortunately, a brief reply is all that is
warranted.
In June 1997, I delivered a thirty-minute luncheon ad-
dress at a conference sponsored by the American Association
of Law Schools. Shortly after I finished my remarks, a friend
of mine, who teaches at Santa Clara Law School, asked if I
would consent to having my remarks published. I was de-
lighted and agreed immediately. I was not asked to provide a
more comprehensive analysis, nor did I have the time to do
so.
3
My address and essay described the U.S. Department of
Justice's takings docket, as well as efforts by the Clinton
Administration to provide regulatory relief to property own-
ers. I also summarized the Administration's opposition to
takings compensation legislation introduced in the 104th
Congress. My purpose was to stimulate further discussion. I
certainly have done that.
I am curious, however, why the co-authors of the re-
* Lois J. Schiffer is the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Division ("ENRD") of the U.S. Department of
Justice. A.B., Radcliffe College (1966); J.D., Harvard Law School (1969); Ad-
junct Professor of Environmental Law at Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, D.C. (1986-present).
1. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Essay, The Need for Takings Law
Reform: A View from the Trenches-A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings
Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (1998) [hereinafter Berger-Kanner Re-
sponse].
2. Lois J. Schiffer, Essay, Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 153 (1997).
3. The origins of my essay are made clear in the essay itself. Schiffer, su-
pra note 2, at 153 n.(unnumbered).
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sponse chose an eleven page republication of an informal
luncheon address-five pages of which are devoted to takings
compensation bills4-as a point of departure for a forty-eight
page, 174-footnote defense of these bills. My brief address
and essay necessarily sketched only a broad outline of the
argument against compensation bills. The literature on
takings generally, and on takings compensation bills in par-
ticular, is voluminous. It contains much in the way of com-
prehensive, scholarly articles by giants in the takings debate
who oppose compensation bills. Any of these articles would
have provided a more comparable springboard from which to
launch a detailed defense of the bills. More to the point, the
Berger-Kanner Response would have benefited from a review
of the existing academic literature in opposition. I am flat-
tered they view my modest, informal contribution as a wor-
thy foil. For the sake of balance, however, I invite interested
readers to benefit from the full debate by reviewing the more
comprehensive analyses. 5
The Berger-Kanner Response contains many errors, but
at least three points require immediate attention. First, the
response mistakenly asserts that it is unfair to express con-
cern that takings compensation bills, as a class, would un-
dermine federal protections designed to prevent pollution or
protect human health and public safety. 6 It is, perhaps, un-
derstandable that the co-authors would fall into this error,
since these bills are difficult to defend in the face of the
4. Schiffer, supra note 2, at 159-64.
5. For articles opposing takings compensation bills, see, e.g., Joseph L.
Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 15 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Prop-
erty, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
265 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legisla-
tion, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (1995). For articles discussing the issue of
regulatory takings generally, see, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law
and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252
(1996); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); John D. Echeverria &
Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of
Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993). I cite these works not because
I agree with everything in them (I do not), but because they are scholarly, pro-
fessional, and balanced discussions of these important issues.
6. See Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 861-65.
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overwhelming public support for environmental protections. 7
The bills themselves, however, make clear that their com-
pensation mandates would apply to these protections.
For example, the leading Senate takings bill in the 104th
Congress, Senate Bill 605, applies to virtually all federal
agency actions, and many state agency actions, including
pollution controls and safety measures.8 Although Senate
Bill 605 would not require compensation for agency actions
taken to abate a nuisance, 9 our basic federal pollution control
laws do far more than abate nuisances. As noted in my
original essay10 , the Congress enacted and has expanded fed-
eral environmental laws precisely because state nuisance law
is inadequate to control smokestack pollution, sewer system
overflows, emissions of chemicals that deplete stratospheric
ozone, and many other forms of pollution. Senate Bill 605
would greatly impair efforts to implement federal pollution
control laws by exposing the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and other agencies to compensation claims by pollut-
ers when these agencies seek to impose many, if not most,
pollution control requirements." The hearing record on Sen-
ate Bill 605 contains many other examples of threats to hu-
man health and public safety that would not be covered by
the bill's nuisance exception and thus would be undermined
by the bill's sweeping compensation mandates.
12
The Berger-Kanner Response notes that a single takings
bill eventually was amended to exclude from its compensa-
tion mandate any federal action the "primary purpose" of
7. See Study Shows 2 in 3 Americans Are "Environmentalists," DENVER
POST, Oct. 19, 1997, at B6 (reporting that sixty-eight percent of Americans con-
sider themselves environmentalists). Only four percent said they were unsym-
pathetic to environmental concerns; citing a nationwide study by former Rea-
gan pollster Richard Wirthlin. Id.
8. S. 605, 104th Cong. §§ 203(1), 203(2), 203(6), 204(a) (1995) (applying
the bill's various compensation mandates to actions of any agency of the United
States, as well as actions of any State agency administering a federal program
or receiving federal funds in connection with a state regulatory program).
9. Id. § 204(d)(1).
10. Schiffer, supra note 2, at 162.
11. See, e.g., The Right to Own Property: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 605] (statement of Gary S. Guzy, Deputy General Counsel, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency).
12. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 605, supra note 11, at 191-202 ("Memo on the
Nuisance Exceptions in H.R. 925 and S. 605," attached to the statement of Jo-
seph L. Sax, Counselor to the Secretary, Department of the Interior).
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which is to prevent an "identifiable hazard to public health or
safety" or "identifiable ... damage to specific property."13
The absence of a comparable provision in the other compen-
sation bills in the 104th Congress, including the leading Sen-
ate bill, is sufficient to justify concern about the effect of
these bills as a class on public health and safety. 14 Moreover,
the "identifiable hazard" exception itself is problematic, for it
would generate compensation claims whenever the specific
property at risk is not identifiable. Suppose the federal gov-
ernment protects wetlands to reduce flood risks, but is un-
able to identify specific homes and businesses that would be
damaged by a flood if the wetlands are filled. 15 The owner of
the wetlands could claim compensation by arguing that the
prospective damage to "specific property" is not "identifiable"
and that the exception does not apply. 16 Because flood risks
often are raised by the cumulative impact of wetlands de-
struction over time, the exclusion provides little comfort.
Second, the Berger-Kanner Response discusses a non-
compensation takings bill introduced in the 105th Congress,
House Bill 1534, the Private Property Rights Implementation
Act of 1997. This bill would amend our nation's landmark
13. Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 863 n. 106.
14. None of the following takings compensation bills contains an
"identifiable hazard" exclusion: Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, S. 605,
104th Cong. (1996); Private Property Owners Bill of Rights, S. 239, 104th Cong.(1995); Private Property Rights Restoration Act, S. 145, 104th Cong. (1995);
Property Rights Litigation Relief Act of 1995, S. 135, 104th Cong. (1995); Pri-
vate Property Owners Bill of Rights of 1995, H.R. 790, 104th Cong. (1995);
Property Rights Litigation Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 489, 104th Cong. (1995).
15. The Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, could be read to suggest
that the only advantage of wetlands is that they provide wildlife habitat. In
fact, wetlands provide other critical benefits. They play a crucial role in the
reduction of flood risks, acting like huge natural sponges to absorb excess wa-
ter. See Lois J. Schiffer & Jeremy D. Heep, Forests, Wetlands and the Super-fund: Three Examples of Environmental Protection Promoting Jobs, 22 J. CORP.
L. 571, 590-91 (1997). Wetlands also purify lakes and streams by filtering out
pollution from runoff, saving cities millions of dollars each year in wastewater
treatment costs. Id. at 591. One study estimates that, excluding Hawaii and
Alaska, wetlands save $30.9 billion annually by preventing flood damage, $1.6
billion annually in water quality improvement, and $4 million annually in pro-
tecting shoreline property from ocean storms. Id. at 590. Wetlands also are
vital to the jobs of commercial fishers, those in the tourism industry, and many
others, generating $72 billion in revenue and providing one million jobs in 1991
alone. Id. at 589 (citing studies). In California, the remaining wetlands have
an estimated economic value of $10 billion annually. Id. (citing studies).
16. It is unclear why takings bill supporters were unwilling to support a
straightforward health and safety exception without undefined qualifiers.
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civil rights laws to revise established ripeness principles in
order to allow claimants to sue local officials in federal court
far earlier in the land use planning process. 17 It also would
abolish decades of carefully crafted abstention doctrine that
allows federal courts to defer to state courts on issues of state
law where such deference is necessary to respect the legiti-
mate role of state courts in our federal system.18 Messrs.
Berger and Kanner suggest that House Bill 1534, while not
"a finely tuned precision tool,"19 is a step in the right direc-
tion. Space limitations preclude an extensive analysis of the
bill's many problems. 20 Perhaps the best indicator of its rela-
tive merits is the overwhelming, bipartisan opposition it has
generated. At the Senate Judiciary Committee markup of
the bill, Chairman Orrin Hatch, a staunch proponent of tak-
ings legislation, acknowledged that House Bill 1534 raises
serious concerns and needs major restructuring before he
would consider bringing it to the floor.21 Three other Repub-
lican Committee Members, Senators Fred Thompson, Mi-
chael DeWine, and Arlen Specter, said they would vote
against the bill on the floor in its current form.22 All eight
Committee Democrats voted against the bill.23 In a letter
signed by Ohio Republican Governor George Voinovich, the
National Governors' Association strongly opposes the bill.
24
More than forty state Attorneys General, including many
Republicans, strongly oppose the bill.25 A sampling of the
many other organizations that oppose the bill is set forth in
the margin.26 The bill has generated such overwhelming, bi-
17. H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)).
18. Id. (adding new subsection (c) that prohibits abstention in specified
cases that concern the use of real property).
19. Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 884.
20. For arguments for and against House Bill 1534, see H.R. REP. NO. 323,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
21. Colleen Schu, Senators to Wrestle over Property Rights Bill Before Floor
Vote, ENV'T & ENERGY WKLY., Mar. 2, 1998, at 10.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Letter from National Governors' Association, National League of Cities,
and U.S. Conference of Mayors to "Member of Congress" (Oct. 21, 1997) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
25. Letter from Forty State and Territorial Attorneys General to Henry J.
Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 24, 1997) (on file with the
Santa Clara Law Review).
26. Groups opposing House Bill 1534 and similar bills on behalf of state and
local officials include the National Governors' Association, the National League
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partisan opposition not because it needs a tune up, but be-
cause it is fundamentally flawed.
Third, the response suggests that Department of Justice
officials "bitterly resist" every legislative proposal to assist
property owners. 27 In fact, the Department of Justice was in-
strumental in developing a compromise measure offered as a
substitute amendment to one of the primary takings bills
being considered by the 105th Congress, House Bill 992, the
Tucker Act Shuffle Relief Act of 1997.28 This bill is intended
to allow property owners to consolidate a takings challenge
with other challenges to federal agency action in a single fo-
rum.29 Although House Bill 992 raises serious constitutional
and policy concerns, the Department of Justice supports an
appropriate compromise that would expand the jurisdiction
of federal district courts to achieve the same goal. The com-
promise has received broad support. 30
Moreover, the Administration has supported amend-
ments to the Endangered Species Act that would codify many
of the landowner protections that the Department of the In-
terior has implemented administratively.31 We have pro-
of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the International Municipal Lawyers
Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Conference
of Chief Justices of the state Supreme Courts. Many other organizations also
oppose House Bill 1534 and similar bills, including the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the American
Planning Association, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Coalition on the Envi-
ronment and Jewish Life, the National Council of Churches of Christ, the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, many national environmental organizations, Sce-
nic America, Great Lakes United, and the National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion. Letters reflecting this opposition are on file with the Santa Clara Law
Review.
27. Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 838.
28. 144 CONG. REC. H1085-1140 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998).
29. The jurisdiction of federal district courts over monetary claims against
the United States, including takings claims, generally is limited to claims up to
$10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1994). As a result, claims for more than
$10,000 generally must be brought in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1994). But challenges to the validity of federal agency action
generally must be brought in federal district or appellate courts. Thus, current
law may preclude a property owner from bringing all relevant challenges to a
federal action in one court. See generally 144 CONG. REC. H1085-1140 (daily
ed. Mar. 11, 1998).
30. The House vote on the compromise alternative was 206-206. See 144
CONG. REC. at H1138. Because the compromise was offered as an amendment
to the underlying bill, it was defeated by the tie vote. It is unclear whether the
Senate will take up this legislation in the remaining months of the 105th Con-
gress.
31. Endangered Species Recovery Act, S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
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vided additional administrative relief to property owners in
the federal wetlands protection program, and general regula-
tory relief in environmental programs across the board.3 2 At
the Department of Justice, we have aggressively promoted
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") and other initiatives
to streamline takings litigation so that property owners and
the government can get these claims resolved in a timely
fashion. As recently as November 1997, the Chief Judge of
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the tribunal that hears al-
most all takings claims against the United States, "expressed
his appreciation for the Department's efforts to promote the
use of ADR.33 While others have devised ill-considered pro-
posals that have little chance of success, the Administration
is providing real relief to property owners.
Finally, I would like to express some concern about the
tone of the Berger-Kanner Response. It contains considerable
vitriol, much of it directed at me personally.34 Nevertheless,
32. See Executive Office of the President, Reinventing Environmental Regu-
lation: Progress Report (1996); Executive Office of the President, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation (1995).
33. Letter from Chief Judge Loren A. Smith to Lois J. Schiffer (Nov. 12,
1997) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
34. The Berger-Kanner Response accuses me, by name, of: "bureaucratic
hubris," Berger-Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 859 n.95; making arguments
that "simply cannot be serious," id.; "tak[ing] liberties" with the facts, id. at
862; using terminology that "resonates the subtext of anti-property rights
ideologues," id. at 863 n.103; disregarding the inscription on the Department of
Justice walls regarding the need to seek justice in every case, id. at 870 n. 131;
using the "technique of omitting what does not fit a polemical author's thesis,"
id., at 864 n.107; being "less than ingenuous," id. at 865; echoing "the deplor-
able fare" of "unscrupulous partisan polemicists," id. at 866; being
"disingenuous," id. at 871; being among the "bogus defenders of stare decisis,"
id. at 874; and so on.
The coauthors seem to have a particular fondness for the word
"functionary;" while it is a perfectly good word, a more generous response
might have acknowledged the role of Department of Justice attorneys as public
servants, which is how the Attorney General rightly insists we view ourselves
and our mission. It is, in fact, an honor for us to serve the American people as
Department of Justice attorneys.
Messrs. Berger and Kanner also suggest that members of the environ-
mental movement "are overwhelmingly affluent upper, and upper-middle class
persons who 'have got theirs ... but expect would-be competing seekers of the
good life to lower their expectations .... Id. at 846. Suffice it to say that
nearly seventy percent of the American people view themselves as environmen-
talists. See supra note 7. Unless the American people (like the children in
Garrison Keillor's fictional Lake Wobegon) are all above average, this statistic
easily defeats the accusation of elitism. The growing Environmental Justice
movement, whose members seek to protect low-income and minority communi-
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I take some comfort in knowing that by being subjected to in-
vective by these authors, I am in good company.35 Unfortu-
nately, this style of argument all too frequently attends the
takings debate, even in academic journals. Individuals on
both sides are guilty.
There is a growing dialogue about civility in the court-
room, 36 but just as important is civility in academia and in
legal journals, many of which, like this one, are edited by the
future leaders of our profession. These students will learn
from our example, and if we want our profession to remain
noble, we owe it to them to avoid ad hominem attacks, to em-
brace courtesy, and to articulate our strongly held views with
decorum.
What we seek at the Department of Justice is balance:
balance in discourse, balance in society, balance between the
property rights of individuals and those of their neighbors,
and balance between the needs of landowners and the com-
munity at large.
ties from disproportionate environmental harm, also is difficult to reconcile
with the elitism thesis. The charge of elitism reflects the misguided notion that
environmental protections inevitably conflict with economic growth. In fact,
the two generally go hand in hand. See generally Schiffer & Heep, supra note
15, at 571-73.
35. Among other things, the coauthors accuse a panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit of a "morally scandalous performance," Berger-
Kanner Response, supra note 1, at 875 n.145, and the entire judiciary
(presumably both federal and state) of "callous insensitivity to constitutional
rights," id. at 881, and "years of quite deliberate judicial obfuscation of takings
law," id. at 882 (emphasis added).
Some time ago, Messrs. Berger and Kanner coauthored a response to an-
other takings article by five highly respected land use scholars and lawyers, to
whom Messrs. Berger and Kanner referred as the "Gang of Five." That Berger
and Kanner response, accurately self-described a "polemic," contains so much
rhetorical flourish at the expense of the original authors that it is possible to
give only a sampling: "anti-intellectual tour de force;" "astonishing display of
intellectual parochialism;" "either grossly misinformed or a dubious attempt at
humor;" "sophistry" (repeatedly); "Orwellian interpretation;" "gaffes;"
"advocating nonsense;" "ethical, legal and economic hogwash;" "the absolutist
dogma embraced and huckstered by the Gang of Five;" "the Brave New World
of the Gang of Five;" "bile and diatribe;" and so on. See Michael M. Berger &
Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the
"Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property,
19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986).
36. See, e.g., Judge Paul L. Friedman, Fostering Civility: A Professional
Obligation, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of
Public Contract Law, Annapolis, Maryland (Mar. 13, 1998) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); Elliott B. Glicksman, Civility:
A Return to Normalcy, 74 MICH. B.J. 894 (1995); Final Report of the Committee
on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441 (1992).
